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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, Appellees submit the following 
brief in response to the arguments set forth by Appellant. 
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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2(a)-
3(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2(a)-3Q). 
Statement of the Case 
The facts of this case are best set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
law entered by the district court on March 7, 2007 (R. 586-590), quoted verbatim herein: 
1. In December 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint against certain of the 
Defendants, which resulted in a judgment being entered against Plaintiff for bad faith 
filing pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-26 (2004) in late 2006. 
2. Plaintiff did not satisfy the judgment entered against him in case number 
050922650. 
3. In an effort to obtain at least partial satisfaction of the judgment in case 
number 050922650, Defendants obtained a Writ of Execution and two Writs of 
Garnishment in that action. 
4. Plaintiffs complaint, filed in this case, focused on these writs. 
5. Attached to Defendants' Writ of Execution were a notice of exemption and 
a request for hearing. 
6. Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to request, and did request, a 
hearing on the writ from the trial court in case number 050922650, and the trial court 
entertained his claims that certain property was exempt from execution. 
4 
7. The judgment issued in case number 050922650 was never stayed or 
otherwise suspended; thus, Defendants were entitled to seek satisfaction of their judgment 
through the use of Writs of Execution and Garnishment. 
8. As permitted by rule, Plaintiff challenged Defendants right to execute on 
certain property in case number 050922650, and after Defendants declared that they had 
no interest in the majority of Plaintiffs property, the trial court ruled on Plaintiffs 
objection and clearly identified the non-exempt property upon which Defendants could 
execute. 
9. Following the hearing, Defendants executed only on the identified non-
exempt property. 
10. The filing of this current action was unnecessary to protect Plaintiffs 
interests and property; all protections available to Plaintiff could have been, and were, 
afforded to him in case number 050922650. In that case, Judge Hanson specifically 
identified the non-exempt property on which Defendants could execute, and he 
specifically limited the scope of Defendants' execution. 
11. The trial court in case number 050922650 was positioned to provide 
Plaintiff with any additional protections, up to and including injunctive relief; however, it 
granted Plaintiff no such relief. 
12. On the day before he filed the complaint in this case, Plaintiff transmitted 
an electronic mailing to the Defendants, notifying them that he intended to file this 
separate lawsuit and indicating that he was doing so, at least in part, to avoid contact with 
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Judge Hanson, whose decisions had dissatisfied him in the past. Plaintiffs message 
concerning Judge Hanson was derogatory in nature. 
13. To support an abuse of process claim, Plaintiff must present some evidence 
that Defendants obtained their Writs for some purpose other than that for which the writs 
are intended. It is clear to this court that Defendants obtained their Writs for the proper 
purpose of satisfying their existing, unsatisfied judgment against Plaintiff. 
14. Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for abuse of process in that 
Plaintiff has failed to plead any improper damages resulting from Defendants resort to 
Writs of Execution and Writs of Garnishment. Further, Plaintiff was provided due 
process on this issue in case number 050922650, where the court provided Plaintiff with a 
hearing and an opportunity to request any and all relief. It is clear from the record that 
Defendants never took actual possession of, and never attempted to sell, any of Plaintiff s 
exempt property, either before or after Plaintiff identified property as exempt. 
15. Plaintiffs claim for injunctive relief is equally without merit. Access to 
injunctive relief requires Plaintiff to show that he has no other speedy remedy available to 
him to seek the relief he seeks through the injunction. Plaintiff was provided with, and 
availed himself of, another speedy remedy concerning Defendants' Writs, i.e., Plaintiff 
was provided with a hearing by the trial court in case number 050922650 and permitted to 
seek redress at that hearing. 
16. The court understands that the nature of this case is the result of emotion 
and that Plaintiff is angry with the Defendants, at least in part due to Defendant Smoak's 
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ongoing representation of Plaintiffs' former domestic partner. 
17. Plaintiffs complaint lacks merit as a whole, and Plaintiff has failed to plead 
sufficient facts to support any of the claims that may be included in his complaint. 
18. Further, the court finds that Plaintiff filed his complaint in bad faith, in part 
to harass and delay Defendants, and in part to avoid any further involvement with Judge 
Hanson. 
R.587-89. 
Summary of Arguments 
Appellant argues that the district court improperly converted Appellees' motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. This argument is without merit. Both sides 
filed affidavits in addition to their pleadings relating to the motion to dismiss. 
Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that a determination pursuant to rule 
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was appropriate. 
Appellant argues that the district court improperly entered a "judgment on the 
pleadings" when no answer had been filed. Appellant also argues that Appellees' 
defenses were improperly raised below because they were not asserted in an Answer. 
These arguments are without merit. The district court converted a motion to dismiss into 
a motion for summary judgment. No additional pleadings were required under Rule 
12(b). 
Appellant argues that his claims should have been dismissed without prejudice 
rather than with prejudice. This argument is absurd, given that the claims were dismissed 
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because they were without merit and asserted in bad faith. 
Last, Appellant argues the district court improperly granted summary judgment 
and attorney fees. Appellant provides no basis for this argument. To the contrary, the 
district court properly determined that this latest lawsuit was, once again, without merit. 
Argument 
I. The District Court Properly Converted the Motion to Dismiss. 
Appellant argues the district court erred when it treated a motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This argument is, on its 
face, without merit. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989) (stating that 
appellate court need not address every argument, issue or claim raised on appeal); see 
also State v. Jones, 783 P.2d 560, 565 (Utah App. 1989) (appellate court will not engage 
in "unnecessary verbiage" to address meritless argument), affd, 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 
1991) 
Rule 12(b) provides in relevant part: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense... to dismiss for failure of the pleading 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b); see also Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86, % 15 n.l, 67 P.3d 
1042; Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). 
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on December 18, 2006. See R. 9-10. 
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Appellees filed the Affidavit of Jeffrey L. Silvestrini in support of this motion. R. 11-16. 
In response, Appellant filed multiple affidavits. See R. 169-213; 214-267. Accordingly, 
the Court, after hearing the matter, see R. 586, determined "because materials outside the 
pleadings were submitted by both parties, the Court deems it appropriate to treat 
Defendants' motion as one for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 
56..." Id. 
Appellant has made no showing that this determination was inappropriate or 
affected the decision in some prejudicial manner. To the contrary, this determination was 
proper. See Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 86 at f 15 n.l ("Stewart and Walter 
submitted affidavits that were not excluded by the trial court. The trial court therefore 
properly treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment."); Thayne v. 
Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d at 124 ("because Beneficial presented evidence outside 
the pleadings, which the district court did not exclude under rule 12(c), the motion is 
properly treated as a motion for summary judgment"); Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, \ 
10, 155 P.3d 893 ("because Defendants' memorandum and attachments do not constitute 
pleadings under rule 7(a), the trial court should have converted the motion into one for 
summary judgment pursuant to rule 12(b)."). Accordingly, the district court's decision 
should not be disturbed. 
II. Appellant's Second and Third Arguments are Nonsensical 
and Without Merit 
Appellant's second argument seems to allege that there cannot be a judgment on 
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the pleadings when no answer is filed. There is no support for this argument; 
indeed, it is nonsensical. By rule, motions to dismiss "may at the option of the pleader" 
be asserted before an Answer is filed. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). The same is - necessarily -
true for motions that are converted to summary judgment motion pursuant to rule 12(b). 
Appellant's third argument seems to allege that defenses were improperly raised 
below because they were not asserted in an answer. Appellant then argues that such 
defenses were waived because they were not asserted in an answer. Once again, 
Appellant misconstrues the very nature of rule 12, which allows the assertion of defenses 
before an Answer is filed. See id. 
Accordingly, Appellant's second and third arguments are spurious and without 
merit. 
III. Appellant's Claims Were Properly Dismissed With Prejudice. 
Appellant's fourth argument is that his claims should have been dismissed without 
prejudice rather than with prejudice. Appellant sets forth no basis for this argument. The 
district court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss on the ground that Appellant's 
underlying Complaint was without merit and filed in bad faith. See R 589. It is absurd to 
argue that a dismissal on this basis should have been "without prejudice," enabling 
Appellant to refile a meritless Complaint. 
IV. Summary Judgment and Attorney Fees Were Proper. 
Appellant's fourth and fifth arguments address the same or similar issues -
whether the district court properly granted summary judgment and attorney fees to 
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appellees. These issues are improperly briefed and should be dismissed for that reason 
alone. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d305,313 (Utah 1998). 
In any event, these arguments are without merit. Appellant's Complaint alleged 
certain improprieties in relation to a garnishment issued by Appellees. See R. 1-8. These 
garnishment proceedings related to yet another bad faith Complaint Appellant filed 
previously (case no. 050922650). See R. 587-89. The district court held that such 
challenges should have been asserted - and in fact were asserted - in a post-judgment 
proceeding relating to case no. 050922650. R. 587 ("Plaintiff was provided with an 
opportunity to request, and did request, a hearing on the writ from the trial court in case 
number 050922650, and the trial court entertained his claims that certain property was 
exempt from execution.") Appellant had no basis to assert anew his challenge to the writ. 
Thus, the district court properly determined that this latest lawsuit was without basis and 
properly dismissed the same. See R. 589-90; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Christiansen 
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, f 6, 136 P.3d 1266 (stating summary 
judgment is appropriate against a party who "fails to set forth facts sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that party's case"); Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utahl984) (stating that a "major purpose of 
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the 
pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder."). 
Based on these findings, the district court also properly awarded fees pursuant to 
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Utah Code section 78-27-56. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2006). Section 78-27-56 
provides, in relevant part: "In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith...." Id. "In order to award 
attorney fees under this provision, a trial court must determine both that the losing party's 
action or defense was 'without merit' and that it was brought or asserted in bad faith." 
Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 ut 46, 7, 122 P.3d 556 (citing Cady v. Johnson, 
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). The district court properly made both determinations. 
See R. 589. Appellant is unable to show these determinations were incorrect. 
Accordingly, Appellant has provided this Court no reason to disturb the district 
court's determinations.1 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellees were awarded attorney fees below pursuant to Utah Code section 78-27-
56. Accordingly, they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. See Pack v. Case, 2001 UT 
App 232, Tf 39, 30 P.3d 436 ( "When a party who received attorney fees below prevails on 
appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." (Internal 
quotations and citation omitted.)). 
The Court should be aware, however, that on August 16, 2007, Appellant filed for 
Appellant sets forth two final arguments regarding the merits of the garnishment 
itself. These issues are not properly before this Court. Indeed, this Court already 
determined that such issues were moot because Appellees did not execute on the property 
in question. See Bryner v. Smoak, 2008 UT App 81 (mem.) (per curiam). 
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bankruptcy protection with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, 
case numbered 07-23795 JAB. Accordingly, Appellees' request for fees, although 
allowed by Utah law, is made herein only as allowed by the Bankruptcy Code and to the 
extent it is not prohibited or otherwise affected by the automatic stay. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant fails to set forth any reason to disturb the district court's decision in this 
matter. Accordingly, the district court's determination should be affirmed and Appellees 
are entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal to the extent such fees are not prohibited 
by the Bankruptcy Code. 
DATED this jd day of March, 2008 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on this / Q day of March, 2008,1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellees' Brief via First Class Mail, postage fully pre-
paid, to the following: 
Roger Bryner, Pro Se 
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd., #330 
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